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Abstract 
 
 We examine the impact of civil war on democratization. Using a theoretical bargaining 
model, we hypothesize that prolonged violence, war termination, the presence of natural 
resources, and international intervention influence democratization. We test these hypotheses 
using an unbalanced panel data set of 96 countries covering a 34-year period. We determine that 
civil war lowers democratization in the succeeding period.  This finding appears to be robust to 
conditioning, different instrument sets, and the measurement of democracy. In addition, we 
observe evidence that external intervention increases democratization.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 With the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq at the end of 2011 and the ongoing 
reduction of international forces from Afghanistan, the question of whether democracy emerges 
post-conflict remains unclear. The fragile nature of democracy in Iraq and the inability to foster 
democratic governance in Afghanistan bring into question the efforts of the United States and its 
partners to build democratic systems in the aftermath of civil conflict. The literature on 
democratization suggests that the prospect of conflict encourages the emergence of 
democratization (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005). After a civil war, however the likelihood of 
future conflict and political decay undoubtedly increases Still, while “turnarounds” in failing 
states are rare, they are more likely to occur in a post-war environment (Chauvet & Collier, 
2009). Curiously, the literature is largely silent on whether civil war significantly alters the 
conditions that bring about democracy. 
 This paper examines the influence of civil war on democratization. If civil war or its 
characteristics incentivize the emergence of democracy, then international institutions and parties 
to civil war are likely to have a keen interest in these incentives. Enhancing or attenuating these 
incentives may increase the likelihood of democratization. On the other hand, if civil war does 
not alter the likelihood of democracy’s emergence, then this implies that the literature does not 
clearly portray the mechanisms of democratization. This finding would also suggest that much of 
the current effort to foster democracy in conflict-prone regions may be prone to failure. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly 
review the literature on the drivers of democratization. The third section develops the testable 
hypotheses, describes the data, and discusses the estimation methology. The fourth section of the 
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paper presents and discusses the results. The last section concludes and offers advice on future 
research. 
 
2. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
In this section, we briefly review the literature on the determinants and outcomes 
associated with civil war and their impacts on democratization. Empirical evidence suggests that 
following civil wars, democracy appears to rebound, but post-war countries have less democratic 
trends than their peaceful counterparts(Chen, Loayza, & Reynal-Querol, 2008).  They are also 
likely to suffer from enduring rivalries that promote continued conflict (Derouen & Bercovitch, 
2008). Civil war, simply put, appears to be a development trap (Collier, 2008; Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004). 
However, theory suggests that democracy may arise as a compromise to prevent and 
settle wars. The economic costs of conflict may encourage parties to democratize (Rosendorff, 
2001). Protracted conflicts may result in the realization that neither side is likely to prevail and 
that the benefits of peace outweigh the benefits of continued conflict (Jensen & Wantchekon, 
2004; Wantchekon, 2004). Democracies may also be attractive given their relative performance 
to autocracies over time (Gleditsch, 2002). Democratic governance, while imperfect, is relatively 
efficient and effective when compared to other forms of governance (Sen, 2000) and appears to 
be growth enhancing (Perotti, 1996).  
Although little empirical evidence is available to suggest whether war impacts 
democratization, studies of post war samples have suggested that if a conflict ends with military 
victory, democratization is less likely to occur (Gurses & Mason, 2008; Joshi, 2010). Significant 
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endowments of natural resources also appear to lower the prospects for democratization 
(Aslaksen, 2010; Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, & O’Halloran, 2006; Ross, 2006) 
Resource-rich societies have fewer incentives to distribute power to stakeholders and higher 
levels of inequality; both of which appear to inhibit democratization (Karl, 1999; Rosendorff, 
2001).  Still others have argued that natural resource endowments may stabilize existing 
democratic regimes (Gurses, 2011).  
External intervention in civil wars may also influence democratization by allowing for 
the formation of credible commitments (Fortna, 2004; Walter, 2001). UN intervention appears to 
generate stable peace and democracy in non-identity wars (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). UN 
intervention may also accelerate the occurrence of democratic elections, although early elections 
may provide an incentive for the emergence of individuals and parties who favor a return to 
conflict (Brancati & Snyder, 2011; Hoddie & Hartzell, 2010; Joshi, 2010). This question is far 
from settled, however, as other studies have found that UN intervention has had no statistically 
significant impact on democratization (Fortna & Huang, 2009) and that intervention can prolong 
war (Cronin, 2010). 
The choice of democracy index and empirical methodology may also significantly 
influence the conclusions with respect to the emergence (or lack thereof) of democracy. Most 
papers employ either the Freedom House measures of civil liberties and political rights or the 
Polity IV democracy score, each of which employs a different strategy for measuring democracy 
and naturally contains measurement error. Some researchers have used Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) or Tobit estimators to argue that a variety of factors including resource rents and war 
characteristics, significantly influence democratization (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Epstein et al., 
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2006; Fortna & Huang, 2009; Ross, 2001). These findings are subject to suspicion, however, due 
to the presence of country-specific effects and the persistence of democracy. When using a 
difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to control for these country-
specific effects and the persistence of the democracy (and other) variables, factors such as 
education, no longer appear to statistically significantly influence democratization ( Acemoglu, 
Johnson, Robinson, & Yared, 2008; Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, & Yared, 2005). More 
recently, an argument has emerged that, in small samples, the system GMM estimator is not only 
consistent but also relatively efficient to the difference GMM estimator with respect to empirical 
investigation of the determinants of democratization (Aslaksen, 2010; Castelló-Climent, 2008; 
Csordás & Ludwig, 2011; Heid, Langer, & Larch, 2012). These studies have found limited 
evidence for a statistically significant relationship between resource rents, education, economic 
growth, and democratization.  We seek to build upon this empirical literature to examine the 
influence of civil war on democratization. 
3. THEORETICAL MODEL 
 The model appearing in this section stresses the outcomes of civil war and the 
competition between the government and the rebels for the populace. The populace, in 
accordance with current counter-insurgency doctrine is the ‘center of gravity.’ We rely on a 
theoretical framework that focuses on bargaining between the government, the rebels, and the 
civilian populace. Any factor that positively influences popular participation in violence 
increases the willingness of the government to offer concessions for its mitigation (Collier, 2008; 
Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). This result suggests that as the costs of war increase, each side may be 
willing to compromise to limit further popular participation. 
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 Following Arena & Hardt (2011), the government, G, and rebels, R, are engaged in 
conflict. G can offer concessions, x ∈ [0,1], to R. If R accepts x, the war ends and G receives 1-x 
while R receives x. The populace, P, which we assume is not engaged in the conflict, receives the 
value of the pre-conflict status quo, q, minus the loss of utility resulting from conflict ξ, where ξ 
∈ (0,1]. 
 If R rejects x, the conflict continues. As Arena & Hardt (2011) argue, R may reject x 
because it views x as low relative to G’s capacity to increase x or because R believes that 
continuing to fight may result in higher economic benefits. R may thus decide to offer, y ∈ [0,1], 
to P, so that some portion of P takes up arms in support of R. We assume that the precise 
proportion of P taking up arms is equal to y, so that (1-y) remains on the sidelines of the ongoing 
conflict. 
Let w be the share of the good in conflict that R expects to obtain from G through 
continued conflict, where w is assumed to depend on the relative strength of R and G. When P 
rejects R’s offer of y, then R expects to acquire w = r/(r+g) where r>0 and g>0 are expressions 
of R’s and G’s strength, respectively. If P accepts R’s offer, then R expects to acquire z 
=(r+y)/(r+y+g) where R retains z(1-y) and P obtains zy for its support of R. 
Let cg, cr, and cp be the costs to G, R, and P of conflict where c ∈ (0,1] and is fixed for 
each of the parties to the conflict. If P accepts R’s offer of y, then G’s payout is 1 – z - cg else 1- 
w - cg. For R, P’s acceptance results in a payout of z(1-y)- cr; otherwise w- cr. Finally, from P’s 
perspective, if P does not accept y, then P’s payout is equal to q - ξ. On the other hand, if P 
accepts y, then a portion of P supports R, and the payout changes to y(q - ξ ) + (1 – y)(z – cp). 
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 P will not accept R’s offer of any amount if P is satisfied with the status quo (Arena & 
Hardt, 2011; Collier & Hoeffler, 2005). Conversely, as the status quo worsens, we would expect 
popular support for a rebellion to increase. How, then, does civil war affect this outcome? War 
occurs because a democratic solution was untenable to the parties and they were willing to bear 
the cost of war. War substitutes for peaceful democratic competition. The termination of war 
suggests that the cost of war has grown too significant (resource exhaustion) or that one party 
triumphed over the other (military victory). A potential method of sharing the benefits of ending 
a conflict would be democratic governance; else there would be an incentive for one or more of 
the parties to continue warfare. On the other hand, the end of conflict could increase the capacity 
of G, lowering the incentive for R to rebel over time, and negatively affect democracy.  
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, the termination of a civil war has a statistically significant 
impact on democratization in the succeeding period 
How, then, do the characteristics of civil war potentially affect this outcome?  A potential 
method of sharing the benefits of ending a conflict would be democratic governance; else there 
would be an incentive for one or more of the parties to continue warfare.  Democratization could 
also increase the capacity of G, lowering the incentive for R to rebel over time. How, then, does 
civil war affect this outcome?  We would expect that protracted war which would cause the value 
of w to diminish, and war without a clear winner where the costs of continued conflict appear 
high and should increase the preference a resolution that would ameliorate the continued costs of 
war.   
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Hypothesis 2a: All else being equal, a war that ends with no clear victor has a statistically 
significant impact on democratization in the succeeding period  
Hypothesis 2b: All else being equal, the termination of a protracted conflict has a statistically 
significant impact on democratization in the succeeding period  
From the perspective of this paper (and the literature), r and g are also important in that 
they are measures of the ability of R and G to continue conflict. If G but not R, for example, has 
access to natural resources, then the capacity of G to wage war would be relatively higher than in 
the instance where neither or both had access to natural resources (and vice versa). This suggests 
that the presence of natural resources may influence the willingness of the parties to avoid 
conflict by setting aside their differences and settling disputes in a democratic manner. 
Hypothesis 3: All else being equal, an increase in the endowment of natural resources has a 
statistically significant impact on democratization in the succeeding period. 
Finally, could outside intervention influence conflict and democratization? An outside 
party could strengthen G or R, and reduce costs to P of conflict. Many Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) that operate in conflict zones have an explicit mission of providing aid to 
non-combatants, reducing the scourge of war. Outsiders, either unwittingly, or because of 
conflicting objectives, can undermine state capacity, or they can encourage power sharing 
through investments in state capacity (McBride, Milante, & Skaperdas, 2011). The displacement 
of state capacity is obvious in Afghanistan where foreign nations provide ‘advice’ to important 
ministries, but interviews suggest that the foreign nations are actually conducting day-to-day 
operations.  
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Hypothesis 4: All else being equal, multi-lateral intervention influences democratization in the 
succeeding period. 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
We now turn to examining the empirical supportfor each of these hypotheses. To do so, 
we employ a panel data set of developing and developed countries to explore this relationship. 
4.1 Data and Model Specification 
One common problem in cross-country studies of democratization is how to properly 
measure the extent of democratization. Democratization is a complex process involving many 
public and private institutions and we readily acknowledge that any measure of democratization 
is likely to be imperfect. Ideally, we would construct a panel data set of civil and political 
institutions to effectively quantify the democratically oriented activities of society. This would 
demand not only significant knowledge about formal institutions but also informal institutions. 
Constructing such a panel data set would require information not only on the political, 
administrative, and fiscal operation of the central government but also about subnational 
governments.  Unfortunately, we cannot readily address these issues with the available data. We 
are left with the standard, albeit imperfect, measures of democratization.  
Several measures of democracy, not surprisingly, are available. The Freedom House, for 
example, constructs measures of civil and political rights, which we can use to construct a 
composite measure of democracy. Violent conflict is included in the calculation of both of these 
scores (it reduces democracy in both cases) biasing the measurement of democracy downward 
during conflict and upwards post-conflict.   Unfortunately, the components of the Freedom 
House measures are not readily available and we are unable to decompose these measures net of 
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conflict. We can, however, examine the components of the Polity IV measures of democracy and 
autocracy. We construct the POLITY score by subtracting the measure of autocracy from the 
measure of democracy; however, two components contain conflict as criteria to determine the 
POLITY score (Vreeland, 2008). We subtract the Regulation of Participation and 
Competitiveness of Participation components of the democracy score as these measures include 
aspects of conflict. To examine the robustness of our results to alternative specifications, we 
compare our constructed measure of democratization to that reported in the Polity IV database. 
To build our final data set, we draw data on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from the 
Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2011); population and other socio-economic 
data from the World Development Indicators (2011), the Correlates of War dataset, and 
peacekeeping data from the United Nations and (Csordás & Ludwig, 2011). We construct a 
measure of natural resource rents per capita and oil rents per capita. We employ this measure 
rather than the more traditional measure of resource rents or exports as a proportion of GDP. 
Warresults in the disruption of economic activity, thus resource rents as a proportion of GDP 
may in fact increase during conflict. We, do test for robustness using both of these more 
traditional measure of resource wealth, which have been linked to lower economic growth, the 
onset of civil war, and lower levels of democracy (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Ross, 2006; Sachs 
& Warner, 1999, 2001). 
For each country in the sample, we have potentially one observation for each of the sub-
periods (1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004) 
(Acemoglu et al., 2005; Castelló-Climent, 2008; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). The annual data are 
noisy and we are concerned that using them may result in spurious correlations. Second, we seek 
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to avoid short-term fluctuations and focus on changes in the variables across time (Fortna & 
Huang, 2009). We also investigate whether the results are robust to alternative measures of 
democracy, estimators, control variables, and instrument size (Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004; 
Roodman, 2008; Wantchekon, 2004). Combining the Polity data with data extracted from other 
sources results in a dataset of 620 observations. The final panel data set is unbalanced and covers 
96 countries from 1970 to 2004. Table 1 defines the variables used in the empirical model and 
their sources. Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics of these variables, the sample 
countries, and time periods, respectively.  
Tables 1-3 here 
 We define the dependent variable, Democracy, as the Polity IV score for democracy net 
of the Regulation of Participation and Competitiveness of Participation components of the 
democracy score.. For robustness we define Democracy-Alternate as the Freedom House 
measure of democracy. Following the Correlates of War database (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010), 
we define war as a dummy variable that is equal to one if a war starts or is ongoing in a period; 0 
otherwise. The end of conflict (War End) is also a dummy variable, coded 1 if a war ends in the 
period; 0 otherwise. Likewise, we create dummy variables to capture a rebel victory (Rebel Win), 
United Nation’s military intervention (U.N. Intervention), and a count variable to capture the 
duration of the conflict in years at its conclusion (Duration). A matrix X of control variables 
includes population, population density, GDP per capita, natural resource endowments, and 
openness to international trade (Gleditsch, 2002; Levine & Renelt, 1992).  
We employ the following estimation strategy to estimate the impact of civil war on 
democratization. 
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Democracyi,t = α0 + β Democracyi,t-1 + τ w i,t-k + γX i,t-k + c i + λ t + u i,t  (1) 
where ci and λt denote the unobserved country and time effects. The subscripts i, k, and t denote 
country, lags, and time period, respectively. The binary indicator, w, indicates whether a war has 
ended. The coefficient τ captures the treament effect of interest. We assume that the error term 
ui,t follows a random walk. The error components’ specification accounts for time-invariant 
characteristics that may influence the development of democracy, to include colonial hertitage, 
geographical location, and cultural characteristics, among others. The specification also accounts 
for unobservable global trends that may also influence the development of democracy.  
4.2 Econometric Issues:  
We replicate and extend the existing literature on the relationship between civil wars and 
democracy. We first present results from a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects 
(FE), and Fixed Effects model with an Autoregressive Process of order 1 disturbance (FE 
AR(1)). We note that the pooled OLS model explicitly assumes that the country-specific effects 
are equal to zero and, in the presence of persistent effects, is inconsistent. We then present the FE 
and FE AR(1) estimates. We note that both error components’ estimators preclude the use of 
several time-invariant variables used in previous literature.1 We must make caveats, however, to 
employ the FE estimator. First, the policy indicator (w) must be strictly exogenous to the uit else 
the FE estimator is inconsistent. If the policy assignment changes in reaction to past outcomes on 
yit., then it violates strict exogeneity. In cases where wit =1 whenever wir =1 for r < t, strict 
exogeneity is usually a reasonable assumption, however, this implies that once a war begins, it 
does not end or, conversely, that when there is no war at time r, there is no war at time t. Our 
interest lies in those cases where war in time r is succeeded by an end to conflict at time t, that is, 
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the cases of wit = 0 that are preceded by wir =1. We are thus concerned that the strict exogeneity 
assumption is violated, rendering the FE and FE AR(1) estimators inconsistent. We also note that 
the Within estimator may be biased and inconsistent in samples with large N and small T and the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable is mechanically correlated with the error term, violating 
its strict exogeneity (Perotti, 1996).  
We are thus immediately confronted with significant econometric issues that, if left 
uncorrected, are likely to result in inconsistent and biased estimates. As democracy may slowly 
change over time, it is probable that the current level of democracy is dependent upon the level 
of democracy in the previous period. While there are significant variations in the level of 
democracy across countries, democracy is relatively stable within countries. Of the 96 countries 
in the sample, 26 experienced no change in the level of democracy throughout their sample 
period. Several authors have recently estimated dynamic models of the relationship between 
democracy and education, finding that the first period lagged level of democracy is statistically 
significant at the 1% level (Aslaksen, 2010; Epstein et al., 2006; Karl, 1999; Rosendorff, 2001; 
Ross, 2006). The individual effects, characterizing the heterogeneity among countries, are a 
second source of persistence over time. Finally, we are concerned that some of the traditional 
determinants of democracy, to include GDP per capita, are endogenous. Previous explorations of 
the determinants of democracy that do not take these potential econometric issues into account 
are likely to be suspect, due to the inconsistent nature of their estimators. 
 One response to these concerns, the difference GMM estimator that (Arellano & Bond, 
1991) propose, is a consistent and possibly efficient estimator in the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable and significant individual effects. Essentially, it uses all available lagged 
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levels of the dependent variable as instruments for the lagged difference of the dependent 
variable as well as any other potentially endogenous variables, beginning with the second lag. 
While theoretically valid, the Arellano-Bond procedure can lead to many instruments and loss of 
precision. The persistence in the levels of education, oil, and democracy may account for the 
insignificant relationships in much of the literature employing fixed effects and various 
difference estimators (Aslaksen, 2010). The Arellano-Bond and Anderson-Hsiao estimators may 
also be ineffective because levels may not be good instruments for differences (Fortna, 2004; 
Walter, 2001); instead, differences may be a superior instrument for the levels (Brancati & 
Snyder, 2011; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Hoddie & Hartzell, 2010; Joshi, 2010) .  
We estimate a system-GMM aimed at controlling for potential endogeneity of the 
democracy variable (Cronin, 2010). We explicitly control for fixed time effects. The short T and 
persistent series, appear to support the extra moment conditions of the system GMM vice the 
difference GMM (Baltagi, 2008). The system GMM estimator should thus produce dramatic 
efficiency gains over the basic difference GMM as the persistence effect of the dependent 
variable grows (Blundell & Bond, 1998). We also use a two-step process and the Windmeijer 
corrected standard errors to address the problems of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.2 
We test the validity of the moment conditions by using the Sargan test. We also test the 
hypothesis that the error term in the second order is not serially correlated and robustness of 
additional moment conditions with the Hansen difference test. Finally, we explore the sensitivity 
of our results to changes in the set of instruments (Roodman, 2008). 
4.3 Empirical Results 
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We find that the end of a civil war statistically significantly negatively impacts the level 
of democracy in the succeeding period (Table 4). Our initial results suggest that the termination 
of a civil war reduces the adjusted Polity score in the succeeding period at the 5% level of 
significance. Following the literature, we present the results from the OLS, FE, and FE AR(1) 
estimators, which suggest that the end of a civil war negatively impacts democratization in the 
succeeding period. The OLS, FE, and FE AR(1) estimators with lagged dependent variables 
should provide the upper or lower bounds on the estimated coefficient of interest (Wooldridge, 
2001), even though these estimators are inconsistent (Columns (1-4)). Turning to the system 
GMM estimates, the estimated coefficient for the termination of conflict is negatively and 
statistically significant. We find that this result is consistent whether we limit the instruments to 
the second-period lagged level or if we allow for all available lags of the instruments for 
democracy (Column 5). We also fail to reject the null hypothesis for whether the error term is 
second order serially correlated, whether we have over identified the model, and whether the 
instruments are exogenous. 
Table  4 here 
4.4 Robustness Checks 
 We now turn to the question of whether the estimated coefficient for War End is 
statistically robust to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables and changes in the set of 
instruments. Our set of conditioning variables includes per-capita GDP, openness to international 
trade, and population, among others.  System GMM may generate false results if the set of 
instruments is too large and Roodman (2008) recommends aggressively testing for sensitivity to 
reductions in the number of instruments; the literature often ignores this recommendation. We 
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thus err on the side of caution and validate results from the lower bound of using the second-
period lagged level to all possible lags.3  
 Table 5 reports the results for the set of estimations using the second period lagged levels 
as instruments for the first period differences. We instrument for the lagged levels of democracy, 
GDP per capita, openness to international trade, and resource rents as a share of GDP. 
Regardless of the set of instruments and additional conditioning variables, the estimated 
coefficient for lagged democracy remains statistically significant and negative. This result 
provides additional evidence that the termination of a civil war appears to induce a decline in the 
level of democracy in the succeeding period. We find scant evidence to corroborate significant 
impacts from these control variables as suggested by the literature.  Our results cast doubt on the 
suggestion that countries experiencing civil war democratize for the same reasons as those 
unaffected by civil war (Fortna & Huang, 2009). Despite any impacts war may have on 
development, or that development may have on war, countries that have experienced war have 
lower subsequent levels of democratization. These findings are consistent when we expand the 
set of instruments up to the fourth lagged levels of the explanatory variables, where applicable 
(Column 10).4 
Table 5 here 
4.5 Characteristics of Civil War  
 Having determined whether the estimated coefficient for the end of civil war is 
statistically robust, we now turn to the question of whether the characteristics of civil war have a 
statistically significant impact on democracy. We explore whether the duration of a civil war, 
whether the war ends with a clear victor, and whether the rebels win the civil war, have an 
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impact on the level of democracy in the succeeding period. Also, we include UN intervention as 
a measure of external intervention, interacted with conflict termination.  Lastly, we include 
education as a regressor in one of our models, as previous literature has argued that education 
significantly influences democratization, but because it is insignificant and reduces our sample 
size, we do not include it elsewhere. Table 6 presents the results of these estimations. 
Table 6 Here 
 We fail to find empirical support for the hypothesis that the duration of civil war 
statistically influences democracy. The estimated coefficient for duration is insignificant in most 
specifications and is fragile with the inclusion of additional instruments. We do find stronger 
evidence that rebel victories and stalemates influence the succeeding level of democracy. Rebel 
victories may reduce the level of democracy in the succeeding period, although the estimated 
coefficient appears to be fragile to specification and sample choice. On the other hand, civil wars 
that end in a stalemate evidently have a positive, statistically significant, and robust influence on 
democratization in the succeeding period.   UN intervention, similarly, shows consistently 
positive and statistically significant impacts on democratization.  These findings suggest that the 
conditions under which a civil war ends are important indicators of a country’s subsequent 
political development.  
4.6 Alternative measures of democracy 
 Lastly, we turn to the question of whether our measure of democracy influences the 
results above. We construct two alternative measures of democracy that range from 1979 to 
2004. The first measure is the adjusted Polity IV democracy score. The second measure is 
derived from the Freedom House’s measures of civil liberties and political rights. We normalize 
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both measures of democracy for comparability with 0 being a complete lack of democracy and 1 
being completely free. We continue to caution that the Freedom House measure of democracy 
may be biased, as we are unable to ascertain the extent to which war affects the measures of civil 
liberties and political rights. 
 We continue to find evidence that the end of civil war negatively affects democratization 
in the succeeding period. The estimated coefficient for civil war is statistically significant at the 
5% and 10% level, depending on the set of explanatory variables and instruments. We continue 
to find support for the hypothesis that U.N. intervention has a positive impact on 
democratization, though this finding does appear to be fragile to the choice of democracy 
variable. The other characteristics of civil war (duration, stalemate, rebel victory) are statistically 
insignificant in this sample, as are the conditioning variables. 
Table 7 Here 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 The question of whether civil war termination improves democracy is timely and 
relevant.  While the termination of civil war is often cause for hope with regards to the 
emergence of democracy, the empirical evidence suggests that this hope may be forlorn.  Civil 
war may damage civil institutes (or inhibit their prospects for growth) such that, in its aftermath, 
more authoritarian forms of government are more likely to emerge.  
In summary, we find evidence that the termination of a civil war negatively impacts 
democracy in the succeeding period. This evidence appears to be robust and statistically 
significant across a number of specifications, instrument sets, and measures of democracy. While 
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many hope that the end of internal conflict will promote the emergence of a democratic society, 
our findings suggest that the post-conflict environment moves towards authoritarian regimes. 
We also find evidence to suggest that external intervention may increase democratization 
in the succeeding period. This finding appears relatively robust though it fails to appear when we 
employ the Freedom House measure of democracy; thus, our conclusions are tinged with a note 
of caution. We argue that this appears to support the argument that outside intervention is 
necessary to promote democratization after a period of internal conflict. The parties may require 
an independent arbiter to not only separate them, but also to moderate discussion and the 
emergence of democracy.  
These findings suggest that merely negotiating a conclusion to civil war is insufficient to 
promote democratization. External intervention, coupled with the end of conflict, appears to be 
supportive of the movement towards a more democratic and representative society. 
  
  20 
 
  
Table 1 
Variables 
 
Variable Definition Units Source 
Democracy (Polity) The degree of openness of democratic 
institutions as measured by the Polity 
IV score for democracy net of the 
Regulation of Participation and 
Competitiveness of Participation 
components of the democracy score. 
-6 to 
7 
 
Population Natural log of population at start of 
period. 
 Penn World Tables 7.0 
Heston, Summers, Aten, 2011 
GDP Per Capita Natural log of purchasing power 
parity adjusted GDP per capita at the 
start of the period.  
 Penn World Tables 7.0 
Heston, Summers, Aten, 2011 
Openness to 
International Trade 
Measured as the sum of exports and 
imports as a share of GDP 
 Penn World Tables 7.0 
Heston, Summers, Aten, 2011 
Education Measures the average number of years 
of schooling of the population over the 
age of 25.  
 www.barrolee.com 
Rents Per Capita Measures the difference between the 
value of production of natural 
resources and total costs of production. 
This is a cumulative measure of oil, 
natural gas, mineral, coal, and forest 
rents.  
 
 World Development 
Indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org 
 
War End Takes the value of 1 if a civil war 
ended during the period. 
0,1 Correlates of War 
(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010) 
Stalemate Takes the value of 1 if a civil war 
ended in a stalemate during the period.   
0,1 Correlates of War 
(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010) 
Rebel Victory Takes the value of 1 if a civil war 
ended in a rebel victory during the 
period.  
0,1 Correlates of War 
(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010) 
Duration Evaluated in the period the conflict 
ends it takes on the number of years a 
conflict was ongoing.  
 Correlates of War 
(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010) 
U.N. Intervention This variable takes the value of 1 if a 
war ended and there was UN 
intervention during the period.  
0,1 Doyle and Sambanis, 2000 
and  
http://www.un.org/en/peaceke
eping/operations 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Series N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Democracy (Polity) 620 1.91 4.56 -6 7 
Population 620 45,397 141,628 455.15 1,300,000 
GDP Per Capita 620 7760 9080 345.97 44813 
Openness to International Trade 620 64.74 44.33 5.31 412.16 
Rents Per Capita 620 37713 87944 0 868256 
Education 593 5.03 3.03 0.195 13.00 
War End 620 .076 .265 0 1 
Duration 620 0.284 1.56 0 20 
U.N. Intervention 620 .011 .106 0 1 
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Table 3 
Sample Countries 
Country Years Country Years 
Algeria 1970-2004 Japan 1970-2004 
Argentina 1970-2004 Kenya* 1970-2004 
Australia* 1970-2004 Lesotho 1970-1999, 2005-2004 
Austria* 1970-2004 Madagascar 1970-2004 
Bangladesh 1975-2004 Malawi 1970-2004 
Belgium* 1970-2004 Malaysia 1970-2004 
Benin 1975-1989, 1999-2004 Mali 1970-2004 
Bolivia 1970-2004 Mauritania* 1970-2004 
Botswana 1970-2004 Mexico 1970-2004 
Brazil 1970-2004 Morocco 1970-2004 
Burkina Faso 1970-2004 Namibia* 1990-2004 
Burundi 1970-1994, 2000-2004 Nepal 1970-2004 
Cameroon 1970-2004 Netherlands* 1970-2004 
Canada* 1970-2004 Nicaragua 1970-1979, 1985-2004 
Central African Rep. 1970-2004 Niger  1970-2004 
Chad 1970-1979, 1985-2004 Nigeria 1970-2004 
Chile 1970-2004 Norway* 1970-2004 
China 1970-2004 Pakistan 1975-2004 
Colombia 1970-2004 Papua New Guinea* 1975-2004 
Congo 1970-2004 Paraguay 1970-2004 
Costa Rica* 1970-2004 Peru 1970-1999 
Cote d'Ivoire 1970-2004 Philippines 1970-2004 
Cuba* 1970-2004 Portugal 1970-1974, 1980-2004 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo* 1970-1994 Qatar 1975-2004 
Denmark* 1970-2004 Romania 1970-2004 
Dominican Rep. 1970-2004 Rwanda 1970-2004 
Ecuador 1970-2004 Senegal 1970-2004 
Egypt* 1970-2004 Sierra Leone 1970-1999 
El Salvador 1970-1979, 1985-2004 Singapore* 1970-2004 
Fiji 1970-1999 South Africa* 1970-2004 
Finland* 1970-2004 South Korea 1970-2004 
France 1970-2004 Spain 1970-1974, 1980-2004 
Gabon 1974-1989, 1999-2004 Sri Lanka 1970-2004 
Gambia 1970-1989, 1995-2004 Sudan 1975-1984, 1990-2004 
Germany* 1994-2004 Swaziland 1970-2004 
Ghana 1970-2004 Sweden* 1970-2004 
Greece 1970-2004 Syria 1970-2004 
Guatemala 1970-1984, 1990-2004 Thailand 1970-2004 
Guyana 1970-2004 Togo 1970-2004 
Haiti 1970-2004 Trinidad and Tobago* 1970-2004 
Honduras 1970-1979, 1985-2004 Tunisia 1970-2004 
Hungary 1970-2004 Turkey 1970-2004 
India 1970-2004 Uganda 1970-1984, 1990-2004 
Indonesia 1970-2004 United Kingdom* 1970-2004 
Iran 1970-1979, 1985-2004 United States* 1970-2004 
Ireland* 1970-2004 Uruguay 1970-2004 
Israel* 1970-2004 Venezuela 1970-2004 
Italy* 1970-2004 Zambia 1970-2004 
 
*Indicates no variation in X-POLITY score for the duration 
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Table 4 
Democracy and Civil War 
 
 Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
AR(1) 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Democracyt-5 0.08** 
(0.02) 
0.35** 
(0.07) 
0.21** 
(0.6) 
0.87** 
(0.29) 
0.78** 
(0.12) 
War End t-5 
-2.02** 
(0.58) 
-1.63** 
(0.59) 
-1.69** 
(0.53) 
-2.00* 
(0.64) 
-1.35* 
(0.59) 
Constant 
0.82** 
(0.14) 
0.37** 
(0.26) 
2.50 
(2.44) 
0.87 
(0.94) 
1.21** 
(0.32) 
      
Time Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 514 514 421 514 514 
ρ -- -- 0.35 -- -- 
R2 0.70 0.31 0.12 -- -- 
Number of 
Instruments 
   9 12 
Lag Limits    2 All available 
lags 
AR(1) test -- -- -- -1.95* -3.07** 
AR(2) test -- -- -- 0.88 1.15 
Sargan Test -- -- -- 0.98 4.20 
Difference Hansen -- -- -- 1.28 0.86 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The instruments are levels of the explanatory variables lagged two periods as 
well as the variables in first differences lagged one period. **,*,+ denote significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% level 
respectively. 
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Table 5 
Robustness Checks 
 
 System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Democracyt-5 1.05** 
(0.21) 
1.04** 
(0.21) 
1.04** 
(0.22) 
0.99** 
(0.19) 
0.78** 
(0.11) 
War End t-5 
-2.12** 
(0.76) 
-2.24+ 
(0.77) 
-2.25** 
(0.77) 
-2.20** 
(0.74) 
-1.48* 
(0.69) 
GDP Per Capita t-5 
-0.32 
(0.42) 
-0.37 
(0.42) 
-0.48 
(0.47) 
-0.56 
(0.51) 
-0.17 
(0.56) 
Population t-5 
 0.13 
(0.07) 
0.29 
(0.35) 
0.24 
(0.33) 
0.18 
(0.42) 
Openness to 
International Trade t-5 
  0.57 
(1.16) 
0.36 
(1.12) 
0.03 
(1.31) 
Rents Per Capita t-5 
   -0.14 
(0.20) 
-0.03 
(0.19) 
Constant 
2.95 
(3.20) 
2.16 
(3.24) 
-0.75 
(6.83) 
1.48 
(6.71) 
0.55 
(6.25) 
      
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 514 514 514 514 514 
Number of 
Instruments 
11 12 14 16 24 
Lag Limits 2 2 2 2 4 
AR(1) test -2.45** -2.44** -2.51** -2.64** -3.28** 
AR(2) test 1.04 1.01 1.02 1.08 1.14 
Sargan Test 1.00 1.04 0.88 0.83 12.42 
Difference Hansen 0.90 0.95 0.82 1.11 8.32 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The instruments are levels of the explanatory variables lagged two periods as 
well as the variables in first differences lagged one period, except in (10) where we employ up to four lags of the 
explanatory variables. **,*,+ denote significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 6 
Characteristics of Civil War 
 
 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Democracyt-5 1.01** 
(0.24) 
0.79** 
(0.11) 
0.97** 
(0.15) 
0.81** 
(0.13) 
War End t-5 
-1.71* 
(0.81) 
-1.41+ 
(0.83) 
-2.23* 
(0.99) 
-1.47* 
(0.69) 
GDP Per Capita t-5 
  -0.48 
(0.45) 
-0.27 
(0.51) 
Population t-5 
  0.25 
(0.33) 
0.27 
(0.51) 
Openness to International 
Trade t-5 
  0.45 
(1.08) 
0.53 
(1.28) 
Rents Per Capita t-5 
  -0.08 
(0.20) 
-0.02 
(0.21) 
Duration t-5 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
-0.11 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
-0.14* 
(0.06) 
U.N. Intervention t-5 
3.39* 
(1.37) 
2.50* 
(1.12) 
3.10** 
(1.09) 
3.26* 
(1.05) 
Rebel Win t-5 
-3.19* 
(1.44) 
-2.99 
(2.13) 
-2.82* 
(1.58) 
-4.71** 
(1.43) 
Stalemate t-5 
2.05* 
(0.93) 
2.38** 
(0.87) 
1.78+ 
(0.89) 
1.81+ 
(1.00) 
Education t-5 
   -0.03 
(0.23) 
Constant 
0.29 
(0.80) 
1.11** 
(0.32) 
-0.34 
(6.46) 
-1.64 
(7.80) 
     
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 514 514 514 492 
Number of Instruments 13 16 19 22 
Lag Limits 2 All 
possible 
2 2 
AR(1) test -2.29* -3.13** -2.85** -2.76** 
AR(2) test 0.98 1.03 0.46 0.64 
Sargan Test 0.75 4.70 0.34 1.41 
Difference Hansen 0.88 0.75 0.49 1.37 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The instruments are levels of the explanatory variables lagged two periods as 
well as the variables in first differences lagged one period. **,*,+ denote significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% level 
respectively. 
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Table 7 
Alternative Measures of Democracy 
 
 System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Dependent Variable Normalized 
Polity 
Normalized 
Freedom 
House 
Normalized 
Polity 
Normalized 
Freedom 
House 
 (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Democracy  
Alternatet-5 
0.73** 
(0.10) 
0.67** 
(0.09) 
0.87** 
(0.19) 
1.06** 
(0.23* 
War End t-5 
-0.15** 
(0.06) 
-0.11* 
(0.05) 
-0.21+ 
(0.11) 
-0.18+ 
(0.08) 
GDP Per Capita t-5 
  -0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.17 
(0.09) 
Population t-5 
  0.04 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
Openness to 
International Trade t-5 
  0.10 
(0.15) 
0.19 
(0.12) 
Rents Per Capita t-5 
  -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
Duration t-5 
  -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
U.N. Intervention t-5 
  0.24* 
(0.10) 
0.13 
(0.09) 
Rebel Win t-5 
  -0.11 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.09) 
Stalemate t-5 
  0.16 
(0.15) 
-0.11 
(0.10) 
Constant 
0.21** 
(0.07) 
0.23** 
(0.06) 
-0.36 
(0.93) 
0.07 
(0.66) 
     
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 429 429 429 429 
Number of 
Instruments 
10 10 19 19 
Lag Limits 3 3 2 2 
AR(1) test -4.39** -4.11** -2.84** -2.62** 
AR(2) test 0.78 -0.04 0.74 -0.10 
Sargan Test 4.32 4.17 7.45 3.68 
Difference Hansen 2.85 0.87 6.96 4.88 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The instruments are levels of the explanatory variables lagged two periods as 
well as the variables in first differences lagged one period. **,*,+ denote significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% level 
respectively.  
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1 We use Likelihood Ratio and F tests to examine if the country and time-specific effects are jointly equal to zero 
and in all cases we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the effects are jointly equal to zero. We thus include 
country and time specific effects for these models. We also test whether the explanatory variables and individual 
effects are correlated using a modified Hausman test to ascertain whether we should employ the Within or random 
effects GLS estimator (Hausman, 1978). We reject the null hypothesis of no correlation in all cases suggesting the 
used of the within estimator. Test statistics are available upon request. 
2 Using the fixed effects estimator, we reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity at the 1% level of significance. 
We also reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 1% level. Test statistics are available upon request. 
3 These estimates are available upon request. 
4 We use the Sargen, Hansen J, and difference in Hansen tests to examine issues of over-identification and 
exogeneity of the instruments. Expanding the set of instruments to the fifth lagged level (where possible) leads to 
  32 
                                                                                                                                                       
values of these tests that are close to the critical values. We exercise caution and reduce the set of instruments to the 
fourth lagged level as suggested by Roodman (2006, 2008). 
